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Abstract
In this contribution to a phenomenology of social network sites (SNS), we see how the share button brings about
an alteration in our being-with others. On the side of the sharer, we see an experience of the world in a mode of
possible retroactive sociality, creating an enigma in the constitution and attention of the subject of a given
experience. On the side of the receiver, we see how being shared with creates sometimes unwelcome
retrospective ideation of the sharer’s experience, and requires a choice whether, by liking or commenting, to
bring the sharer into retroactive awareness of having been experiencing the shared alongside the receiver. Only if
and when the shared has been received and the reception has been shared is asynchronous being-with at a
distance constituted.
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A Phenomenology of SNS Sharing

In this contribution to a phenomenology of social network sites (SNS), we see how the share button
brings about an alteration in our being-with others. Similar phenomena have already been observed
and theorized in other media, as in despatialized simultaneity and the decoupling of time and space
(Thompson, 1995), remote connectivity in a mobile private sphere (Papacharissi, 2010), connected
presence (Campbell and Park, 2008), and the space of flows (Castells, 2000). While the focus of this
paper is SNS sharing, it is hoped that the analysis will be of a kind fundamental enough to be clearly
applicable (although perhaps sometimes in different and incomplete ways) to these similar modes of
mediated construction of shared experience.
The analysis takes place against the background of Heidegger’s consideration of loneliness, and its
goal is, first, to explicate the process whereby SNS allow the construction of asynchronous shared
experience, and, second, to demonstrate that some of the user experiences resulting from sharing are
rightly characterized as “shared experience” in a substantial sense.
Heidegger (1962) argues that it is only because our mode of being is fundamentally social—Dasein is
always already Mitsein—that it is possible for us to be lonely. Loneliness follows from the ontic
condition of not being with others of a being that is ontologically being-with others; loneliness, then, is
being-with in a negative mode.
SNS “sharing” allows two or more persons to experience an object of attention together
asynchronously and at a distance. Typical objects of such shared experience include an article or
website, a song or video, or an image—as for example a funny cat picture, or a photograph of one’s
meal. The construction of a shared experience of this object of attention consists schematically of two
processes, joined together by the technically necessary but experientially unrelated process of SNS
posting: (1) the initial experience of the sharer prior to sharing and (2) the subsequent experience of
the receiver following sharing.
(1). The pre-sharing experience of the sharer is an experience of the present as potentially at a later
time retrospectively experienced by another as having been experienced along with the sharer, hence
representing a distinct and unprecedented intermediate between the negative mode of being-with in
loneliness and the positive mode of being-with in community. This is a novel experiential presence of
the modal category of the possible, whose resolution into actual presence or non-presence of others is
determined in the future—in Ihde’s (1990) phenomenology of human-technology relations, it appears
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as an asynchronous form of embodiment technics, but which produces an enigma position within the
constitution and attention of the subject ((I/We-)-technology à world), forming an opposite extreme
to his alterity relation (I à technology-(-world)).
Once habituated to the possibilities of retroactive construction of shared experience presented by SNS,
we carry our networks along with us as persons or groups whom we are potentially in the future to
have currently been with. The misspelled store sign we see now is experienced no longer as something
that would have been funny to experience with an absent friend, but as something which is funny to
potentially be retroactively currently experiencing with an absent friend—should we only choose to
photograph and share it with that friend. This is similar to the internal narrativization of daily
experience in anticipation of the possibility of later recounting to friends who may be concerned with
or amused by the events experienced, but is substantially different in that sharing constructs the object
itself as subject to shared experience, while narrative recounting can aim only towards an “as if”
presence of the object of experience to the other. In the case of projected posterior narration, we ideate
the later retelling as a layer placed on top of the current experience, whereas in the potentially shared
experience we ideate the retroactive gaze of the absent friend through the very lens of our camera
phone as an added co-present subjectivity—and this ideation affects our experience whether or not we
choose, in the end, to post the picture.
(2). In the reception of the shared object of attention, the receiver experiences the object alongside a
retrospective ideation of the sharer’s initial experience, which, however, is only experienced as
potentially knowingly along-with the receiver, again representing an intermediate between negative
and positive modes of being-with. When the receiver experiences the shared object she projects
backwards the sharer’s experience of the object. She may seek to reconstruct the sharer’s experience in
asking, for example, what’s supposed to be funny about it, or perhaps whether the sharer shared this as
something to be celebrated and enjoyed or something to be lamented. In any case, if she considers
indicating receipt of the shared object through commenting, liking, or sharing the post, she must
imagine not only the sharer’s experience of the object, but the sharer’s ideation of the receiver’s
experience of the object—roughly speaking, she must imagine the experiencing-together of the object
by the sharer and the receiver. The retrospective construction of such a shared experience may be
meaningful, creating a mutual feeling of warmth and closeness, or may even be highly disruptive, as in
the case of a parent who comments upon a child’s drunken photograph.
The technical act of SNS sharing, being related only externally to the sharer’s experience of something
as to be shared, often fails to reach all and only the ideationally intended recipients. While for the most
part and for most users this is a feature rather than a bug, allowing for collateral benefits in accidental
contributions to the maintenance and development of untargeted relationships, the receiver may be
forced to engage in unwelcome ideation of the sharer—“who is my cousin such that she shared this?”;
“does my former student really think this is funny?”—or may simply have been invited by implication
into a group, context, or event of a too-intimate nature.
This transgressive form of sharing (“oversharing”), which creates a retrospective ideation of beingwith the sharer against the will and preferences of the receiver, has a parallel in a transgressive form of
receiving a shared experience. Having been accidentally included as potential recipient of a shared
event, the recipient can create retroactive co-presence in the past experience against the will and
preferences of the sharer. The parent may know full well that he is not among the community of
intended recipients of the child’s post, and by replying to it may rightly be called a “creeper.” Both
parties must recognize that the merely external relation between the ideational and technical acts of
sharing creates accidental moments of publicity, which call for civil inattention (Goffman, 1971). In
an offline example of these mirrored forms of transgression, while it is surely transgressive to use the
bathroom with the door open while company is over, it is also surely trangressive, having accidentally
walked into the bathroom in use, to assume that one has implicitly been invited to stay.
Only once the shared has been received and the reception has been shared is asynchronous being-with
at a distance constituted—the circle must be closed at both ends, otherwise consisting only of an
abstract and generic being-possibly-with on the part of the sharer and a being-merely-alongside on the
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part of the receiver. By articulating these moments in the construction of asynchronous shared
experience at a distance through SNS sharing we can see the intricate and rich modulations of beingwith resulting from what we might call—following Heidegger’s analysis of loneliness—the sudden
ontological being-online of our lives, in which synchronous, monomodal offline life is merely a
negative mode of synchronous, multimodal being-online.
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